

20 June 1970

Referred by [REDACTED]
for inclusion in the official
file of IAC Minutes [REDACTED]

29 June 1970

Historical Staff O/DCI
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: An Unrecorded Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee

1. In going through the Minutes of the IAC during the Hillenkoetter period, I find no record of an IAC meeting that I attended in early March 1950. This was the only formal IAC meeting ever held to consider the substance of an intelligence estimate, prior to the advent of General Smith as DCI.* It was also the only meeting of the IAC that I attended between the departure of Admiral Souers and the arrival of General Smith. The date could probably be definitely determined by reference to the file on ORE 91-49, which was the subject of the meeting.

2. In those days the Chief, ICAPS, served as the Secretary of the IAC. I suggest that there are no Minutes because the subject of the meeting was an intelligence estimate rather than a plan for coordination, and consequently the Chief, ICAPS, did not attend. No Secretary, no Minutes. It was, however, a formal meeting of the IAC as such. As I recall it, the persons present were the DCI (Adm. Hillenkoetter), all of the regular members of the IAC, [REDACTED] and myself.

3. The title of ORE 91-49 was "Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Security of the United States and upon the Probabilities of Direct Soviet Military Action." Because the latter part of that subject was an extension

* There are references to two other IAC meetings held for this purpose, on 15 March and 2 April 1948, in Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 20, and Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 35. There are no Minutes for those meetings either. The first was probably considered to be an adjourned session of the irregular meeting convened by [REDACTED] on 12 March, not a regular meeting of the IAC. Certainly, the product was a CIA memorandum, IM-21, not a formal estimate in the ORE series. In the second case, the author, [REDACTED], seems to have assumed that the IAC would have met to adopt ORE 22-48. Actually, ORE 22-48 was adopted by voting slip (by mail), without a meeting. That was the method of IAC consideration and concurrence normally employed in those days.

25X1A

of ORE 22-48, "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948," [REDACTED] was in charge of the project, but I supported him from time to time.

25X1A

4. As its number indicates, ORE 91-49 was initiated late in 1949. [REDACTED] sent out a first draft on 10 February 1950. Its coordination with the representatives of the departmental intelligence agencies proved impossible as the Army and Air Force representatives sought to make political and budgetary propaganda in the name of intelligence and the State and Navy representatives sought to counter them by going to the opposite extreme. I do not now recall what distinguished the Army's position from that of the Air Force, or State's position from that of the Navy, but five separate and distinct positions on the subject were developed and intransigently maintained, with CIA [REDACTED] exactly in the middle.

25X1A

25X1A

5. It was the Director of Naval Intelligence who requested a meeting of the IAC to discuss the subject. At that meeting the DCI stated with finality that [REDACTED] draft presented his position. The other members of the IAC stated their positions in turn, proving only that their representatives had faithfully represented them -- or that they were faithfully representing their representatives. No one responded to what anyone else had said; there was no discussion whatever. When the last IAC member had spoken, an acutely embarrassing silence ensued. The DCI just sat there like a graven image, saying nothing and absolutely rigid, without even an expression on his face. Finally I took over the meeting from the foot of the table and led a brief discussion. It was evident that no conversions could be made, but I sought to clarify the various departmental positions. Then I proposed that the draft be remanded for reconsideration in the light of the discussion -- such as it was -- and the meeting broke up.

25X1A

6. On 14 March 1950 [REDACTED] and I sent out a revised draft for final concurrence or dissent. The revisions were intended only to take account of and counter the anticipated dissents. The last of them came in on 5 April and ORE 91-49 was published on 6 April with four dissents.

25X1A

7. ORE 91-49, with all of the departmental agencies dissenting, has been cited as the reductio ad absurdum of interdepartmental coordination. So it was -- but it is rarely observed that the departmental dissents all contradicted one another. It is a commentary on the times that [REDACTED] and I were unable to persuade anyone

to join us in the middle of the road, but it is just as remarkable that Army-Air Force and State-Navy were unable to agree even with each other. Thus did Departmental Intransigence make his master-piece.

25X1A



25X1A



TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank. TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document. Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filed in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--|------------------------|--|
| DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION | | REGISTRY | |
| SOURCE | | CIA CONTROL NO. | |
| DOC. NO. TS 1571 | | DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED | |
| DOC. DATE | | LOGGED BY | |
| COPY NO. | | | |
| NUMBER OF PAGES | | | |
| NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS | | | |

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

| REFERRED TO | RECEIVED | | | RELEASED | | SEEN BY | | |
|-------------|---|----------------|------|----------|-------|---|-------------|-------------------|
| OFFICE | SIGNATURE | DATE | TIME | DATE | TIME | SIGNATURE | OFFICE/DIV. | DATE |
| HS/DCI |  | 1970 26 JAN | | 1/26/70 | 10:00 |  | HS/DCI | 26 JAN 1970 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | HS | 30 AUG 1971 |
| 25X1A | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 25X1A | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

| | | | | | |
|----------------|------|--------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|
| DOWNGRADED | | DESTROYED | | DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) | |
| TO | | BY (Signature) | | TO | |
| BY (Signature) | | WITNESSED BY (Signature) | | BY (Signature) | |
| OFFICE | DATE | OFFICE | DATE | OFFICE | DATE |

Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100110001-7